

# Accuracy First: Selecting a DP Level for Accurate ERM

BIRS 2018, NIPS 2017, TPDP 2017

Seth V. Neel

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
# Authors



Seth Neel, Bo Waggoner, Katrina Ligett, Steven Wu, Aaron Roth

# Motivation

- After over a decade of intense study, DP is beginning to see large scale deployments by companies like Apple and Google.



- ERM is the core task in machine learning
- Privacy is a priority, but absent regulation, accuracy is likely the first order concern
- **Natural question:** *Subject to a given accuracy level, what is the best privacy level one can obtain?*

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What if accuracy is **critical** to the system?



# This work<sup>1</sup>

## Question

Given an accuracy requirement, can we run a learning algorithm **as privately as possible**?

**Setting:** empirical risk minimization.

*Given data and a loss function, find an “accurate” hypothesis.*

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<sup>1</sup>*Accuracy First: Selecting a Differential Privacy Level for Accuracy-Constrained ERM.* Joint with Katrina Ligett, Seth Neel, Aaron Roth, and Z. Steven Wu. *NIPS*, 2017.

# Private Accurate ERM

- Empirical risk function:

$$L(\theta, D) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ell(\theta, (X_i, y_i)) + \frac{\lambda}{2} \|\theta\|_2^2$$

- Let  $\theta^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta \in C} L(\theta, D)$
- Given accuracy tolerance  $\alpha$ , find the most private  $\theta_{priv}$  :

$$L(\theta_{priv}, D) \leq L(\theta^*, D) + \alpha$$

# Private ERM

- Many algorithms: output/objective/covariance perturbation, exponential mechanism, SGD [Koufogiannis 2017, Smith 2017, Williams 2010, Chaudhuri 2008, Bassily 2014]
- Accuracy guarantees:  $\epsilon$  privacy  $\implies f(\epsilon)$  accuracy
- Given accuracy  $\alpha$  solve for  $\epsilon = f^{-1}(\alpha)$

How to go beyond worst-case analysis?

# Naive Search: Doubling...

- For  $t \in [T]$  generate  $\epsilon_t$ -private hypothesis  $\theta_t$
- Check privately if  $L(\theta_t, D) \leq L(\theta^*, D) + \alpha$ 
  - if **yes**: **stop**, output  $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_t)$
  - if **no**: double  $\epsilon_t$
- Final ex-post privacy loss is:  
(cost publishing  $\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^t$ ) + (cost checking accuracy  $\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^t$ )

How to formalize the privacy guarantee?

# Road Map

- Formalizes a notion of *ex-post* privacy: privacy loss is data-dependent
- Gives an ex-post analysis of the AboveThreshold algorithm with private queries
- Application to two private ERM algorithms
- Use of *gradual release* technique [Koufogiannis 2017] improves upon doubling method

# Ex-post privacy loss

All outputs are private but some outputs of an algorithm may be more *private* than others. In Math:

## Definition (ex-post privacy loss)

$$\text{Loss}(o) = \max_{D, D': D \sim D'} \log \frac{P[\mathcal{A}(D) = o]}{P[\mathcal{A}(D') = o]}.$$

## Definition (Ex-Post Differential Privacy)

We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  satisfies  $\mathcal{E}(o)$ -*ex-post* differential privacy if for all  $o \in \mathcal{O}$ ,  $\text{Loss}(o) \leq \mathcal{E}(o)$ .

- Related to the notion of privacy odometers [Rogers, Roth, Ullman, Vadhan 2016]
- Ex-post differential privacy has the same semantics as differential privacy, once the output of the mechanism is known: it bounds the log-likelihood ratio of the dataset being  $D$  vs.  $D'$ , which controls how an adversary with an arbitrary prior on the two cases can update her posterior.

# Our Approach

$$\overbrace{\underbrace{\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^t}_{\text{publishing hypothesis}} + \underbrace{\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^t}_{\text{checking accuracy}}}^{\text{privacy cost of search}}$$

- 1 To privately evaluate the error of each  $\theta^t$  use AboveThreshold (Trick: Ex-post AboveThreshold)
- 2 Generate  $\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^t$  such that publishing any prefix  $(\theta^1, \dots, \theta^k)$  released incurs only privacy loss  $\epsilon_k$  (Trick: Noise Reduction)



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True (non-private)  $\theta$

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1.0 \\ 4.0 \\ \dots \\ 2.0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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
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
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
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- 3 If not accurate enough, “rewind” the walks!


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
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# Our framework: example

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use `INTERACTIVEABOVETHRESHOLD` to check accuracy





# Ex-post Above Threshold I

- We want to publish the most private query  $\theta_t \in \{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^T$  whose accuracy is above the threshold  $\alpha$
- Standard priv analysis: publish all the private queries and run AboveThreshold
- Intuitively, we want to generate and publish queries one at a time until the algorithm halts
- Pay only for the queries we publish: requires an *ex-post* analysis

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**Algorithm 2** InteractiveAboveThreshold:  $\text{IAT}(D, \varepsilon, W, \Delta, M)$

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**Input:** Dataset  $D$ , privacy loss  $\varepsilon$ , threshold  $W$ ,  $\ell_1$  sensitivity  $\Delta$ , algorithm  $M$

Let  $\hat{W} = W + \text{Lap}\left(\frac{2\Delta}{\varepsilon}\right)$

**for** each query  $t = 1, \dots, T$  **do**

    Query  $f_t \leftarrow M(D)_t$

**if**  $f_t(D) + \text{Lap}\left(\frac{4\Delta}{\varepsilon}\right) \geq \hat{W}$  **then** Output  $(t, f_t)$ ; **Halt.**

Output  $(T, \perp)$ .

---

# Ex-post Above Threshold II

Suppose that the prefix  $\{f_1, \dots, f_t\}$  is  $\epsilon_t$ -differentially private. Then ex-post AT is  $(\epsilon + \epsilon_t)$ -ex-post differentially private.

**Proof.**

$$\frac{\Pr[\text{IAT}(D) = t, f_1, \dots, f_t]}{\Pr[\text{IAT}(D') = t, f_1, \dots, f_t]} = \frac{\Pr[\text{IAT}(D) = t \mid f_1, \dots, f_t]}{\Pr[\text{IAT}(D') = t \mid f_1, \dots, f_t]} \frac{\Pr[M(D) = f_1, \dots, f_t]}{\Pr[M(D') = f_1, \dots, f_t]} \leq e^{\epsilon_A} \cdot e^{\epsilon_t} = e^{\epsilon_A + \epsilon_t},$$

- $\epsilon_0 \approx O\left(\frac{\log(T/\gamma)}{\alpha n}\right)$ ;  $\epsilon_t$  data-dependent - can be much smaller!

# Intuition for privacy improvement


The **noisier** estimates reveal no private information conditioned on the **least noisy** one!

True (non-private)  $\theta$

$$\begin{pmatrix} ? \\ ? \\ \dots \\ ? \end{pmatrix}$$

Random walk noise

Private output  $\theta'$


$$\begin{pmatrix} 1.73 \\ 4.26 \\ \dots \\ 1.41 \end{pmatrix}$$


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


Private output  $\theta'$

$\begin{pmatrix} 1.35 \\ 4.29 \\ \dots \\ 1.53 \end{pmatrix}$


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# Noise Reduction [Koufogiannis 2017]

- Instead of generating private hypothesis  $\{\theta_t\}$  independently via the Laplace Mechanism, use correlated noise technique
- Each  $\theta_t$  is a post-processing of every  $\theta_s, s < t$
- Publishing the prefix  $\{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_t\}$  incurs only loss  $\epsilon_t$  instead of  $\sum_{s=1}^t \epsilon_s$ , by post-processing



Gradual Private Release via Random Walk with Laplace Marginals

# High-level paradigm

known algorithms for differentially-private learning

*example above: output perturbation*



INTERACTIVEABOVETHRESHOLD (accuracy checks) and  
**NoiseReduction** (random-walk) techniques




learning algorithms that are “as private as possible”

# Experiments: vs using theorems




# Experiments: vs using theorems

Logistic regression. Classify network activity in KDDCup99 dataset,  $n = 100k$ .




# Experiments: vs using theorems (2)

Linear (ridge) regression. Predict  $\log(\text{retweets})$  on Twitter dataset,  $n = 100k$ .



# Experiments: vs using Doubling



# References



Privacy Odometers and Filters: Pay-as-you-Go Composition



Private Empirical Risk Minimization



Privacy-Preserving Logistic Regression



Gradual Release of sensitive data under differential privacy.



Is interaction necessary for distributed private learning?